# Entropy at the Beginning of Time, 1.2

Logical arrow of time, 10.2.2

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If at the beginning, the universe had a high entropy, it was at a macrostate corresponding to many indistinguishable microstates.

That description is self-contradictory, because “two macroscopically-indistinguishable microstates” is meaningful only if they were once macroscopically distinguishable before.

That is not possible for the state(s) at the beginning of the universe, because at that moment, there was no “before”.

So it is meaningless to label the universe’s beginning macrostate as “a state corresponding to many indistinguishable microstates”.

Instead, we should label the universe’s beginning state as “a state corresponding to one single microstate”.

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For example, assume that the universe was at the macrostate $\displaystyle{A}$ at the beginning; and the $\displaystyle{A}$ is corresponding to two macroscopically-indistinguishable microstates $\displaystyle{a_1}$ and $\displaystyle{a_2}$.

Although microstates $\displaystyle{a_1}$ and $\displaystyle{a_2}$ are macroscopically-indistinguishable, we can still label them as “two” microstates, because they have 2 different histories — history paths that are macroscopically distinguishable.

However, for the beginning of the universe, there was no history. So it is meaningless to label the state as “a macrostate with two (or more) possible microstates”.

So we should label that state not only as one single macrostate but also as one single microstate.

In other words, that state’s entropy value should be defined to be zero.

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If in some special situation, it is better to label the universe’s beginning state as “a state with non-zero entropy”, that state will still have the smallest possible entropy of the universe throughout history.

So it is not possible for the universe to have “a high entropy” at the beginning.

— Me@2022-01-08 02:38 PM

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# Entropy at the Beginning of Time, 1.1

Logical arrow of time, 10.2.1

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Two distinguishable macrostates can both evolve into one indistinguishable macrostate.

— Me@2013-08-11 11:08 AM

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Note that, tautologically, any system can be at only one single macrostate at any particular time.

So the statement actually means that it is possible for two identical systems at different macrostates evolve into the same later macrostate.

— Me@2022-01-08 03:12 PM

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But the opposite is not possible. Two indistinguishable macrostates is actually, by definition, one macrostate. It cannot evolve into two distinguishable macrostates.

One single macrostate is logically impossible to be corresponding to two different possible later macrostates.

— Me@2022-01-08 01:29 PM

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If the beginning universe state had a high entropy, by definition, it was at a macroscopic state with many possible macroscopically-indistinguishable microstates.

However, if it is really the state of the universe at the beginning, it is, by definition, a single microstate, because “different microstates” is meaningful only if they were once distinguishable.

— Me@2013-08-11 01:42 PM

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a macrostate = a set of macroscopically-indistinguishable microstates

— Me@2022-01-09 07:43 AM

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The meaning of “entropy increases” is that state $\displaystyle{S_1}$ and state $\displaystyle{S_2}$ both evolve into state $\displaystyle{S_3}$.

But for the beginning of the universe, there were no multiple possible macrostates that the beginning state could be evolved from.

— Me@2013-08-11 01:44 PM

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# 魚目混珠 1.2

Pure evil does no harm, because if someone is purely evil, everyone will know that and avoid him.

It is the evilness of a good man that creates big harm.

The evilness of great man creates the biggest harm.

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An organization cannot be purely evil.

Anything purely evil cannot be big, because being big requires consistency, which requires good.

— Me@2011.10.11

— Me@2022-01-08

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# Book Underlining Principle

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When you are reading, you would underline key words. At one extreme, you underline nothing. So you wouldn’t know which parts are important. At the opposite extreme, you underline everything. Then you also wouldn’t know which parts are important. So the effect of underlining nothing is exactly the same as underlining everything.

This is an example of the principle that

The extreme of Yin is Yang

The extreme of Yang is Yin

That is why I call the principle the Book Underlining Principle.

The source of this principle is that when you push something to one extreme at the object level, that action may also push it to the opposite extreme at the meta level.

For example, when you underlining all the words, at the object level, it means that everything is important. However, at the meta level, “being important” must be relative to something else. You need to distinguish the important words from the unimportant ones. When you underlining all the words, there is no such distinction. So “being important” has become meaningless.

— Me@2021-12-13 11:08 AM

— Me@2021-12-26 03:39 PM

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# Eternal return, 2

A “perfect copy” is not a “copy”, because if a copy is perfect, it would be logically indistinguishable from the original.

In other words, we would not be able to determine which one is the “copy” and which one is the “original”, even in principle.

There would be no meaningful difference between the meanings of the labels “copy” and “original”.

— Me@2013-08-11 1:38 PM

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# Meta numbers

Numbers are meta objects.

Infinities are meta numbers.

— Me@2017-02-03 05:20:51 PM

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# Alfred Tarski 4

Godel 20

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[guess]

A system can be both complete and consistent because in that system, a metatheorem cannot be translated into a theorem, so a paradox cannot be made.

[guess]

— Me@2017-04-10 10:40:38 AM

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# Meta-time 7

Two dimensional time, 6

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y is meta x

~ y is the next dimension of x

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y is meta-time

~ y is the second dimension of time

— Me@2017-07-10 06:12:08 PM

— Me@2021-03-26 06:00:45 PM

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# 大腦物理性損毀不是比喻, 2

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— 李穎

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2020.08.04 Tuesday ACHK

# Omnipotence 4.2

When responding to the question “can X create a stone that it cannot lift”, another flawed argument is

X can create the stone that it cannot lift but it chooses not to create it. So there is no stone it cannot lift yet. So X has not failed the omnipotence test.

This argument is wrong.

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When we ask “can X choose to create a stone that it cannot lift”, we are discussing whether X has an ability. When we discuss ability, it is always about a potential, a possibility.

Y is able to do action B

always means that

“Y does B” is possible,

which is equivalent to

“Y does B” is not contradictory to any logical laws nor physical laws.

“Whether Y has already done B or will do B” is not the point.

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If we allow such “Y can do B but it chooses not to” argument, then anyone is omnipotent. For example,

Can you fly?

I can fly but I choose not to. So even though you have never seen me flying and will never see me flying, it is not because I cannot fly; it is just because I choose not to.

Can you choose to fly?

I can choose to fly but I choose not to choose to fly.

This type of arguments make the word “can“ meaningless.

— Me@2020-03-30 06:52:58 AM

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# 太極滅世戰

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「間書原理」的意思，其實是「陽之極為陰；陰之極為陽」。但那不易理解，所以，我在十多年前，舉了「間書」的例子：

— Me@2003-2004

— 改編自李天命先生

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（問：「不理成績」而又要「盡情發揮」？自相矛盾也？）

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Wikipedia
public domain image

— Me@2020-04-13 06:58:18 PM

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# Omnipotence 4.1

For all, 3 | Omnipotence

For all, 3.2 | Omnipotence 2

You can find them by searching “omnipotence” using this blog’s search box.

— Me@2020-04-08 03:17:34 PM

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If X is omnipotent, X can create a stone that it cannot lift. Then X is not omnipotent, because there is a stone it cannot lift. So omnipotence is a self-contradictory concept.

What if we define omnipotence not as “being able to do anything” but as “being able to do anything except logical self-contradictory ones“?

In order words, omnipotence means that being able to do anything logically possible. Omnipotence does not mean that being able to do also logically impossible things.

This re-definition is not useful, because the original meaning of “being omnipotent” already is “being able to do anything except logical self-contradictory ones“.

There is no re-definition needed. You can only say that the re-definition clarifies the original meaning of “being omnipotent”. However, this clarification cannot eliminate the self-contradictory nature of the meaning of “omnipotence” itself. For example, the following argument is wrong.

If X is omnipotent, “X can create a stone that it cannot lift” is self-contradictory because it is contradictory to “X is omnipotent”.

Since “X can create a stone that it cannot lift” is logically impossible, it should not be a requirement of being omnipotent.

This argument is wrong because:

1. “X can create a stone that it cannot lift” is not SELF-contradictory.

2. “X can create a stone that it cannot lift” is not logically impossible, because, for example, even a human being can create an object that he cannot lift. For example, human beings can create a car that no single person can lift.

Then someone might keep arguing that

But if X is omnipotent, “X can create a stone that it cannot lift” means that “X is omnipotent and X can create a stone it cannot lift”, which is logically impossible. So “X cannot create a stone that it cannot lift” does not make X non-omnipotent.

In other words, “whether X can create a stone that it cannot lift” should not be the requirement of the omnipotence test.

The argument is wrong, because what we are questioning is

Can someone X be omnipotent?

or

Is omnipotence logically possible?

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Remember:

“Being logically possible” means “not self-contradictory”.

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If “X is omnipotent” is true,

then “X can create a stone that it cannot lift” is true.

Then “there is a stone that X cannot lift” is true.

Then “X is not omnipotent” is true.

But “X is not omnipotent” is contradictory to the assumption “X is omnipotent“.

So “X is omnipotent” is self-contradictory.

So the question “whether an entity X can be omnipotent and create a stone that it cannot lift” is illegitimate because “an entity X is omnipotent” is logically impossible in the first place. It should not be placed within a question.

Note that our omnipotent test is

“whether an entity X can create a stone that it cannot lift”,

NOT “whether an entity X can be omnipotent and create a stone that it cannot lift”,

NOR “whether an omnipotent entity X can create a stone that it cannot lift”.

— Me@2020-03-30 06:52:58 AM

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# Frequency probability and Bayesian probability, 2.2

The probability frequentist vs Bayesian debate can be transcended by realizing that an observer cannot be separated from the observed.

— Me@2011.07.23

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# Two dimensional time 5.2.3

The first time direction is uncontrollable; the second is controlled by making choices, traveling through different realities. Future is a set of parallel universes.

— Me@2017-12-15 10:59:49 AM

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The first time direction, which is along the timeline, is uncontrollable, because one can only travel from the past to the future, not the opposite.

The second direction, which is across different timelines, is controlled by making choices, forming different realities.

— Me@2019-12-21 11:03:23 PM

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# Two dimensional time 5.2.2

time direction ~ direction of change

multiple time directions ~ multiple directions of change

— Me@2019-12-22 04:38:47 PM

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the first dimension of time ~ direction of change

the second dimension of time ~ direction of change of changes

— Me@2019-12-22 04:46:47 PM

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# Multiple dimensions of time

Two dimensional time 5.2 | 二次元時間 5.2

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What would be the implications of multiple dimensions of time?

That means the (past) history itself can change, as commonly seen in time travel stories.

But wouldn’t that be the case with one dimension also?

In reality, there is only one dimension of time, meaning that the state of a system keeps changing, forming the timeline. But the timeline itself cannot be changed once formed. In other words, (past) history cannot be changed.

— Me@2019-08-11 04:07:48 PM

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# Alfred Tarski, 3

The undefinability theorem shows that this encoding cannot be done for semantic concepts such as truth. It shows that no sufficiently rich interpreted language can represent its own semantics. A corollary is that any metalanguage capable of expressing the semantics of some object language must have expressive power exceeding that of the object language. The metalanguage includes primitive notions, axioms, and rules absent from the object language, so that there are theorems provable in the metalanguage not provable in the object language.

— Wikipedia on Tarski’s undefinability theorem

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Tarski’s 1969 “Truth and proof” considered both Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and Tarski’s undefinability theorem, and mulled over their consequences for the axiomatic method in mathematics.

— Wikipedia on Alfred Tarski

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2019.07.20 Saturday ACHK

# Confirmation principle

Verification principle, 2.2 | The problem of induction 4

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The statements “statements are meaningless unless they can be empirically verified” and “statements are meaningless unless they can be empirically falsified” are both claimed to be self-refuting on the basis that they can neither be empirically verified nor falsified.

— Wikipedia on Self-refuting idea

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In 1936, Carnap sought a switch from verification to confirmation. Carnap’s confirmability criterion (confirmationism) would not require conclusive verification (thus accommodating for universal generalizations) but allow for partial testability to establish “degrees of confirmation” on a probabilistic basis.

— Wikipedia on Verificationism

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Confirmation principle should not be applied to itself because it is an analytic statement which defines synthetic statements.

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Even if it does, it is not self-defeating, because confirmation principle, unlike verification principle, does not requires a statement to be proven with 100% certainty.

So in a sense, replacing verification principle by confirmation principle can avoid infinite regress.

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Accepting confirmation principle is equivalent to accepting induction.

“This is everything to win but nothing to lose.”

— Me@2012.04.17

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# The problem of induction 3.3

“Everything has no patterns” (or “there are no laws”) creates a paradox.

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If “there are 100% no first order laws”, then it is itself a second order law (the law of no first-order laws), allowing you to use probability theory.

In this sense, probability theory is a second order law: the law of “there are 100% no first order laws”.

In this sense, probability theory is not for a single event, but statistical, for a meta-event: a collection of events.

Using meta-event patterns to predict the next single event, that is induction.

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Induction is a kind of risk minimization.

— Me@2012-11-05 12:23:24 PM

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