Omnipotence 4.2

When responding to the question “can X create a stone that it cannot lift”, another flawed argument is

X can create the stone that it cannot lift but it chooses not to create it. So there is no stone it cannot lift yet. So X has not failed the omnipotence test.

This argument is wrong.

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When we ask “can X choose to create a stone that it cannot lift”, we are discussing whether X has an ability. When we discuss ability, it is always about a potential, a possibility.

Y is able to do action B

always means that

“Y does B” is possible,

which is equivalent to

“Y does B” is not contradictory to any logical laws nor physical laws.

“Whether Y has already done B or will do B” is not the point.

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If we allow such “Y can do B but it chooses not to” argument, then anyone is omnipotent. For example,

Can you fly?

I can fly but I choose not to. So even though you have never seen me flying and will never see me flying, it is not because I cannot fly; it is just because I choose not to.

Can you choose to fly?

I can choose to fly but I choose not to choose to fly.

This type of arguments make the word “can“ meaningless.

— Me@2020-03-30 06:52:58 AM

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2020.04.19 Sunday (c) All rights reserved by ACHK

太極滅世戰

機遇創生論 1.5

這段改編自 2010 年 4 月 18 日的對話。

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這個大統一理論的成員,包括(但不止於):

精簡圖:

種子論
反白論
間書原理
完備知識論

自由決定論

它們可以大統一的成因,在於它們除了各個自成一國外,還可以合體理解和應用。

下一個定律,就是「間書原理」。

「間書原理」的意思,其實是「陽之極為陰;陰之極為陽」。但那不易理解,所以,我在十多年前,舉了「間書」的例子:

我們平日看書時會間書:用紅筆間低重要的句子。

間書的一個極端是一句也不間。那我們就不知哪些是重要句子。

間書的另一個極端是句句間。那我們也不知哪些是重要句子。

— Me@2003-2004

其他例子有:

順其自然:在生活中百分百地「順其自然」,是一件十分不自然的事。

不要執著:要求自己在任何情況下也「不要執著」,本身是一個執著。

— 改編自李天命先生

知道這個原理後,你在生活處世,凡事就自然不會走得太盡,因為你知道,企圖走得太盡的後果是,輕則過猶不及,重則物極必反。

間書原理 水清則無魚

另外,運氣太好時,你會格外小心,因為,好事可以引發壞事,而大好事可以引發大壞事。運氣太差時,你亦不要過份擔心,因為,只要保命,運氣比「太差」更差的話,隨事引發大好事。

我一直以為,尋尋覓覓,兩把年紀,仍然未找到另一半,不幸也。但是,在 2019 滅世戰開始後,我發覺仍然單身,是極大的福份。

或許,到 2021 時,地球和我都仍然存在的話,宇宙會把我一切的夢想,化身成人,和我一同去創造,無限個嶄新的世界。

好事可以變好事

壞事可以變壞事

好事可以變壞事

壞事可以變好事

不要奢望,你可以控制到事情,向這四個方向中的哪一個去發展。你只可以引導,你只可以鼓勵,你不可以控制。

這正正呼應我剛剛講的「種子論」。你可以控制起點,卻不可以控制結果。

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當你對「間中原理」深刻心領神會後,你不會輕易羨慕別人的「運氣」或者「天份」,因為通常,凡事有代價。看到別人好時,你反而會問:「他付出了什麼代價,作出了什麼犧牲?」

當你對「間中原理」深刻心領神會後,有時,你更可以主動使用。

例如,以前的眾多考試中,有時,有溫習的那一次,成績反而比沒有溫習的那一次低。

其實,原因並不是「有沒有溫習」本身,而是你「是不是太過刻意」,去奪取成績。

不如,你試試積極溫習,然後,不理成績地,盡情發揮。或許,你有意想不到的收穫。

(問:「不理成績」而又要「盡情發揮」?自相矛盾也?)

你只能提升獲得佳績的機會率,所以,要試前積極溫習,試試盡情發揮;但是,你卻不能直接控制,將要奪得什麼成績,所以,要「不理成績」。

又例如,你下次失眠時,你試試躺下,然後張開雙眼,嘗試迫自己清醒。或者,不知不覺間,你會睡著了。

再例如,如果你由於怕做得不好,而遲遲拖延著一些必須事務的話,你不妨反轉心態,試試在你的能力範圍內,把該事做到最差。或許那樣,你不會再拖延,反而會極早基本完成了該事,剩下了時間,給你改善那「草稿」。

間書原理 置之於死地而後生

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主動版的「間中原理」,其實就是「種子論」。

把手緊握 什麼都沒有
把手放開 你得到一切

主動版的「間中原理」,可以戲稱為「耍太極」。

1171e-yin_and_yang

Wikipedia
public domain image
陽之極為陰 陰之極為陽

— Me@2020-04-13 06:58:18 PM

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2020.04.16 Thursday (c) All rights reserved by ACHK

Omnipotence 4.1

Please read these 2 posts first:

For all, 3 | Omnipotence

For all, 3.2 | Omnipotence 2

You can find them by searching “omnipotence” using this blog’s search box.

— Me@2020-04-08 03:17:34 PM

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If X is omnipotent, X can create a stone that it cannot lift. Then X is not omnipotent, because there is a stone it cannot lift. So omnipotence is a self-contradictory concept.

What if we define omnipotence not as “being able to do anything” but as “being able to do anything except logical self-contradictory ones“?

In order words, omnipotence means that being able to do anything logically possible. Omnipotence does not mean that being able to do also logically impossible things.

This re-definition is not useful, because the original meaning of “being omnipotent” already is “being able to do anything except logical self-contradictory ones“.

There is no re-definition needed. You can only say that the re-definition clarifies the original meaning of “being omnipotent”. However, this clarification cannot eliminate the self-contradictory nature of the meaning of “omnipotence” itself. For example, the following argument is wrong.

If X is omnipotent, “X can create a stone that it cannot lift” is self-contradictory because it is contradictory to “X is omnipotent”.

Since “X can create a stone that it cannot lift” is logically impossible, it should not be a requirement of being omnipotent.

This argument is wrong because:

1. “X can create a stone that it cannot lift” is not SELF-contradictory.

2. “X can create a stone that it cannot lift” is not logically impossible, because, for example, even a human being can create an object that he cannot lift. For example, human beings can create a car that no single person can lift.

Then someone might keep arguing that

But if X is omnipotent, “X can create a stone that it cannot lift” means that “X is omnipotent and X can create a stone it cannot lift”, which is logically impossible. So “X cannot create a stone that it cannot lift” does not make X non-omnipotent.

In other words, “whether X can create a stone that it cannot lift” should not be the requirement of the omnipotence test.

The argument is wrong, because what we are questioning is

Can someone X be omnipotent?

or

Is omnipotence logically possible?

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Remember:

“Being logically possible” means “not self-contradictory”.

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If “X is omnipotent” is true,

then “X can create a stone that it cannot lift” is true.

Then “there is a stone that X cannot lift” is true.

Then “X is not omnipotent” is true.

But “X is not omnipotent” is contradictory to the assumption “X is omnipotent“.

So “X is omnipotent” is self-contradictory.

So the question “whether an entity X can be omnipotent and create a stone that it cannot lift” is illegitimate because “an entity X is omnipotent” is logically impossible in the first place. It should not be placed within a question.

Note that our omnipotent test is

“whether an entity X can create a stone that it cannot lift”,

NOT “whether an entity X can be omnipotent and create a stone that it cannot lift”,

NOR “whether an omnipotent entity X can create a stone that it cannot lift”.

— Me@2020-03-30 06:52:58 AM

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2020.04.10 Friday (c) All rights reserved by ACHK

Two dimensional time 5.2.3

The first time direction is uncontrollable; the second is controlled by making choices, traveling through different realities. Future is a set of parallel universes.

— Me@2017-12-15 10:59:49 AM

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The first time direction, which is along the timeline, is uncontrollable, because one can only travel from the past to the future, not the opposite.

The second direction, which is across different timelines, is controlled by making choices, forming different realities.

— Me@2019-12-21 11:03:23 PM

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2019.12.22 Sunday (c) All rights reserved by ACHK

Two dimensional time 5.2.2

time direction ~ direction of change

multiple time directions ~ multiple directions of change

— Me@2019-12-22 04:38:47 PM

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the first dimension of time ~ direction of change

the second dimension of time ~ direction of change of changes

— Me@2019-12-22 04:46:47 PM

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2019.12.22 Sunday (c) All rights reserved by ACHK

Multiple dimensions of time

Two dimensional time 5.2 | 二次元時間 5.2

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What would be the implications of multiple dimensions of time?

That means the (past) history itself can change, as commonly seen in time travel stories.

But wouldn’t that be the case with one dimension also?

In reality, there is only one dimension of time, meaning that the state of a system keeps changing, forming the timeline. But the timeline itself cannot be changed once formed. In other words, (past) history cannot be changed.

— Me@2019-08-11 04:07:48 PM

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2019.08.11 Sunday (c) All rights reserved by ACHK

Alfred Tarski, 3

The undefinability theorem shows that this encoding cannot be done for semantic concepts such as truth. It shows that no sufficiently rich interpreted language can represent its own semantics. A corollary is that any metalanguage capable of expressing the semantics of some object language must have expressive power exceeding that of the object language. The metalanguage includes primitive notions, axioms, and rules absent from the object language, so that there are theorems provable in the metalanguage not provable in the object language.

— Wikipedia on Tarski’s undefinability theorem

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Tarski’s 1969 “Truth and proof” considered both Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and Tarski’s undefinability theorem, and mulled over their consequences for the axiomatic method in mathematics.

— Wikipedia on Alfred Tarski

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2019.07.20 Saturday ACHK

Confirmation principle

Verification principle, 2.2 | The problem of induction 4

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The statements “statements are meaningless unless they can be empirically verified” and “statements are meaningless unless they can be empirically falsified” are both claimed to be self-refuting on the basis that they can neither be empirically verified nor falsified.

— Wikipedia on Self-refuting idea

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In 1936, Carnap sought a switch from verification to confirmation. Carnap’s confirmability criterion (confirmationism) would not require conclusive verification (thus accommodating for universal generalizations) but allow for partial testability to establish “degrees of confirmation” on a probabilistic basis.

— Wikipedia on Verificationism

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Confirmation principle should not be applied to itself because it is an analytic statement which defines synthetic statements.

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Even if it does, it is not self-defeating, because confirmation principle, unlike verification principle, does not requires a statement to be proven with 100% certainty.

So in a sense, replacing verification principle by confirmation principle can avoid infinite regress.

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Accepting confirmation principle is equivalent to accepting induction.

“This is everything to win but nothing to lose.”

— Me@2012.04.17

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2019.04.06 Saturday (c) All rights reserved by ACHK

The problem of induction 3.3

“Everything has no patterns” (or “there are no laws”) creates a paradox.

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If “there are 100% no first order laws”, then it is itself a second order law (the law of no first-order laws), allowing you to use probability theory.

In this sense, probability theory is a second order law: the law of “there are 100% no first order laws”.

In this sense, probability theory is not for a single event, but statistical, for a meta-event: a collection of events.

Using meta-event patterns to predict the next single event, that is induction.

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Induction is a kind of risk minimization.

— Me@2012-11-05 12:23:24 PM

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2018.12.28 Friday (c) All rights reserved by ACHK

The problem of induction 3.1.2

Square of opposition

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“everything has a pattern”?

“everything follows some pattern” –> no paradox

“everything follows no pattern” –> paradox

— Me@2012.11.05

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My above statements are meaningless, because they lack a precise meaning of the word “pattern”. In other words, whether each statement is correct or not, depends on the meaning of “pattern”.

In common usage, “pattern” has two possible meanings:

1. “X has a pattern” can mean that “X has repeated data“.

Since the data set X has repeated data, we can simplify X’s description.

For example, there is a die. You throw it a thousand times. The result is always 2. Then you do not have to record a thousand 2’s. Instead, you can just record “the result is always 2”.

2. “X has a pattern” can mean that “X’s are totally random, in the sense that individual result cannot be precisely predicted“.

Since the data set X is totally random, we can simplify the description using probabilistic terms.

For example, there is a die. You throw it a thousand times. The die lands on any of the 6 faces 1/6 of the times. Then you do not have to record those thousand results. Instead, you can just record “the result is random” or “the die is fair”.

— Me@2018-12-18 12:34:58 PM

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2018.12.18 Tuesday (c) All rights reserved by ACHK

The problem of induction 3.2

The meaning of induction is that

we regard, for example, that

“AAAAA –> the sixth is also A”

is more likely than

“AA –> the second is also A”

 

We use induction to find “patterns”. However, the induced results might not be true. Then, why do we use induction at all?

There is everything to win but nothing to lose.

— Hans Reichenbach

If the universe has some patterns, we can use induction to find those patterns.

But if the universe has no patterns at all, then we cannot use any methods, induction or else, to find any patterns.

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However, to find patterns, besides induction, what are the other methods?

What is meaning of “pattern-finding methods other than induction”?

— Me@2012.11.05

— Me@2018.12.10

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2018.12.10 Monday (c) All rights reserved by ACHK

The problem of induction 3

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In a sense (of the word “pattern”), there is always a pattern.

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Where if there are no patterns, everything is random?

Then we have a meta-pattern; we can use probability laws:

In that case, every (microscopic) case is equally probable. Then by counting the possible number of microstates of each macrostate, we can deduce that which macrostate is the most probable.

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Where if not all microstates are equally probable?

Then it has patterns directly.

For example, we can deduce that which microstate is the most probable.

— Me@2012.11.05

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2018.11.19 Monday (c) All rights reserved by ACHK

defmacro, 2

Defining the defmacro function using only LISP primitives?

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McCarthy’s Elementary S-functions and predicates were

atom, eq, car, cdr, cons

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He then went on to add to his basic notation, to enable writing what he called S-functions:

quote, cond, lambda, label

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On that basis, we’ll call these “the LISP primitives”…

How would you define the defmacro function using only these primitives in the LISP of your choice?

edited Aug 21 ’10 at 2:47
Isaac

asked Aug 21 ’10 at 2:02
hawkeye

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Every macro in Lisp is just a symbol bound to a lambda with a little flag set somewhere, somehow, that eval checks and that, if set, causes eval to call the lambda at macro expansion time and substitute the form with its return value. If you look at the defmacro macro itself, you can see that all it’s doing is rearranging things so you get a def of a var to have a fn as its value, and then a call to .setMacro on that var, just like core.clj is doing on defmacro itself, manually, since it doesn’t have defmacro to use to define defmacro yet.

– dreish Aug 22 ’10 at 1:40

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2018.11.17 Saturday (c) All rights reserved by ACHK

defmacro

SLIME, 2

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Alt + Up/Down

Switch between the editor and the REPL

— Me@2018-11-07 05:57:54 AM

~~~

defmacro

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(defmacro our-expander (name) `(get ,name 'expander))

(defmacro our-defmacro (name parms &body body)
  (let ((g (gensym)))
    `(progn
       (setf (our-expander ',name)
	     #'(lambda (,g)
		 (block ,name
		   (destructuring-bind ,parms (cdr ,g)
		     ,@body))))
       ',name)))

(defun our-macroexpand-1 (expr)
  (if (and (consp expr) (our-expander (car expr)))
      (funcall (our-expander (car expr)) expr)
      expr))

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A formal description of what macros do would be long and confusing. Experienced programmers do not carry such a description in their heads anyway. It’s more convenient to remember what defmacro does by imagining how it would be defined.

The definition in Figure 7.6 gives a fairly accurate impression of what macros do, but like any sketch it is incomplete. It wouldn’t handle the &whole keyword properly. And what defmacro really stores as the macro-function of its first argument is a function of two arguments: the macro call, and the lexical environment in which it occurs.

— p.95

— A MODEL OF MACROS

— On Lisp

— Paul Graham

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(our-defmacro sq (x)
  `(* ,x ,x))

After using our-defmacro to define the macro sq, if we use it directly,


(sq 2)

we will get an error.

The function COMMON-LISP-USER::SQ is undefined.
[Condition of type UNDEFINED-FUNCTION]

Instead, we should use (eval (our-macroexpand-1 ':


(eval (our-macroexpand-1 '(sq 2)))

— Me@2018-11-07 02:12:47 PM

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2018.11.07 Wednesday (c) All rights reserved by ACHK

Existence and Description

Bertrand Russell, “Existence and Description”

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§1 General Propositions and Existence

“Now when you come to ask what really is asserted in a general proposition, such as ‘All Greeks are men’ for instance, you find that what is asserted is the truth of all values of what I call a propositional function. A propositional function is simply any expression containing an undetermined constituent, or several undetermined constituents, and becoming a proposition as soon as the undetermined constituents are determined.” (24a)

“Much false philosophy has arisen out of confusing propositional functions and propositions.” (24b)

A propositional function can be necessary (when it is always true), possible (when it is sometimes true), and impossible (when it is never true).

“Propositions can only be true or false, but propositional functions have these three possibilities.” (24b)

“When you take any propositional function and assert of it that it is possible, that it is sometimes true, that gives you the fundamental meaning ‘existence’…. Existence is essentially a property of a propositional function. It means that the propositional function is true in at least one instance.” (25a)

— Brandon C. Look

— University Research Professor and Chair

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2018.10.07 Sunday ACHK

Simpson’s paradox

d_2018_10_06__21_40_12_PM_

Simpson’s paradox, or the Yule–Simpson effect, is a phenomenon in probability and statistics, in which a trend appears in several different groups of data but disappears or reverses when these groups are combined.

— Wikipedia on Simpson’s paradox

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d_2018_10_05__19_25_22_PM_

— MinutePhysics

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2018.10.06 Saturday ACHK

神的旨意 2.4

魔:為什麼「全能」者不可「全惡」?

甲:你如果是「全能」,就毋須問我這個問題。

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如果你是「全惡」,你的構成部分,就不能相處。而「你」,作為一個整體,並不會存在;必須散落成一大堆,獨立的部分而存在。而各個分部,各自內裡必有善部,才可能凝聚,不再分裂。

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魔:即使我不是「全惡」;即使我有所謂「善部」,你難保我「惡部」的法力,大於「善部」?

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甲:

第一,即使假設是那樣,那也沒有大意義,因為,你總不能完全忽略,你善部的旨意。

如果你的惡部,完全不理善部地作惡,那就即是,你的善部名存實亡。沒有善部,「你」必會分裂。

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第二,除了你存在以外,我也存在;其他生命體也存在。

善的會合作,那是定義。善的會合作,去抵擋你的惡。

雖然,惡部有「破壞容易過建設」的優勢,但是,善部也可以應用「破壞容易過建設」,去破壞惡部的破壞計劃 。

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第三,惡人自有惡人磨:

相似的人,因為各種原因,傾向身處相近的地方,簡稱「物以類聚」。

壞人的身邊,通常是其他壞人。壞人最怕的,往往是其他壞人。

最終對付你的人,是你自己。最終對付你惡部的人,是你自己的惡部。

— Me@2018-09-02 03:05:45 PM

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2018.09.02 Sunday (c) All rights reserved by ACHK

The Sixth Sense, 3

Mirror selves, 2 | Anatta 3.2 | 無我 3.2

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You cannot feel your own existence or non-existence. You can feel the existence or non-existence of (such as) your hair, your hands, etc.

But you cannot feel the existence or non-existence of _you_.

— Me@2018-03-17 5:12 PM

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Only OTHER people or beings can feel your existence or non-existence.

— Me@2018-04-30 11:29:08 AM

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2018.04.30 Monday (c) All rights reserved by ACHK